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Milwaukee Collaborative Reform Initiative
Community Feedback Portal
For the Milwaukee Police Department and Fire and Police Commission
Chapter 3: Recruitment, Hiring, and Personnel Practices
MPD does not have a racial, ethnic, and gender diversity composition through all ranks and components that is reflective of the community it serves.
Neither MPD nor FPC has a strategic plan for recruiting and hiring.
FPC has not completed a job task analysis for the position of police officer since 2007.
Information on hiring for MPD is not available to the public on a consistent basis.
MPD and FPC recruitment programs lack professional standards.
FPC and MPD do not have a mechanism for external input from the community regarding the recruitment and hiring of MPD officers.
Promotional Practices for MPD lack written procedures
MPD does not have career development planning for officers wh. aspire to be promoted or selected for a special assignment.
The draft report skips the number 9
Chapter 4: Community Oriented Policing Practices
MPD does not have a formal, Department-wide strategy that guides officers, supervisors, and commanders in its community building efforts.
MPD does not hold all members of the Department accountable for engaging in community policy activities.
MPD members generally do not understand their roles in community policing and rely on Community Liaison Officers (CLO) to engage in community policing activities.
FPC has not consistently reviewed policies annually as required pursuant to Wisconsin law.
Community surveys indicate a gap in trust between white and non-white residents in Milwaukee
Chapter 5: Use of Force and Deadly Force Practices
MPD has undertaken a commitment to provide all MPD officers Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training.
There is no formal training for Internal Affairs Division (IAD) supervisors and investigators on how to conduct use of force investigations.
MPD does not have specific guidelines for conducting use of force investigations, specifically how investigations are conducted, what evidence should be collected, and which supporting materials are gathered.
IAD investigations of critical incidents are too passive, as investigators mostly rely on criminal investigators to collect the appropriate information for an administrative review.
Documentation, collection and marking of video evidence collected in use of force and deadly force investigations are inconsistent making it difficult to determine if those investigative steps occurred or were just not documented.
MPD does not provide specific direction for supervisors for obtaining videos for the Use of Force Report and investigation, whether from the vehicle, body camera, surrounding businesses, or other places.
IAD investigative files do not adequately document involved officer interviews.
MPD IAD reports do not reference what steps are taken to provide critical incident support services to involved officers.
Investigative case files did not reflect whether supervisors and commanding officers conducted reviews of use of force investigations to determine the need for further documentation, review, or investigative steps.
The use of force investigations being conducted by supervisors, and the review by commanding officers and IAD, are not completed within established timelines identified by policy.
Although audio or video recordings of civilian witnesses are required, the audio or video recording of involved and witnessing officers is not.
MPD policy states that "members with a body worn camera (BWC) shall make every effort to activate their BWC for all investigative or enforcement contacts," allowing for discretion when the capture of video is critical.
MPD command does not routinely review the involved officer(s)' use of force, complaint, and discipline history in use of force investigations.
The AIM system lacks sufficient data storage capacity causing use of force investigative reports, evidence reports, and supporting documentation to be located in multiple places.
MPD does not capture or report use of force data in a way that can be easily aggregated, analyzed, and reported.
The FPC has ended its practice of releasing an annual report on MPD firearms discharges.
MPD has recently announced that it will no longer be outsourcing fatal officer-involved shooting incidents to the Wisconsin DOJ, instead opting for a regional approach with other local law enforcement agencies.
MPD does not have a policy for releasing critical incident information to the public in a timely fashion.
Chapter 6: Citizen Stop and Search Practices
MPD's traffic stop practices have a disparate impact on the African-American community.
Pedestrian stops by MPD lack proper oversight and accountability.
Community member are concerned that MPD engages in stop practices that are inflammatory to the community ethos, particularly the reported practice of "curbing" individuals.
MPD's traffic stop information system is cumbersome and time-consuming, which results in traffic stops taking a significant amount of time.
Chapter 7: Systems for Supervision, Accountability, Organizational Learning, Remediation, and Discipline
MPD policy does not provide for appropriate oversight and require IAD to assess whether a complaint should be investigated by a district or by IAD.
MPD's policy regarding complaints from community members allows a supervisor to determine whether a complaint form shall be completed.
MPD policy does not clearly define what constitutes a serious complaint.
MPD policy does not require that members are notified when they are the subject of a complaint investigation.
MPD Standard Operating Procedure 450 regarding complaint investigations is inadequate, as it does not have required time frames for completion of external and internal investigations.
MPD does not analyze trends, patterns, or other issues associated with complaint data.
Complaint investigation files are poorly organized, lack consistency, and are often incomplete.
Many community members expressed frustration and distrust in the citizen complaint process and oversight of MPD.
MPD's Progressive Disciplinary Matrix is ill-defined and not applied consistently.
MPD was proactive and developed its Early Intervention Program (EIP) in 2008. MPD subsequently engaged a focus group in 2012 to assess the program and the efficacy of the triggers. Input was not obtained from an EIP professional for either process.
MPD's EIP policy does not sufficiently identify roles and responsibilities related to its EIP.
MPD does not examine aggregated EIP data to identify potential patterns and trends across the organization.
MPD EIP policies and practices are not fully supported or known throughout the Department.
MPD does not have a written directive that states "dishonesty in any matter of official police business is a terminable offense."
The Milwaukee Police Department does not state that "the ability to testify in court with credibility" is an essential job function on the police officer job description.
The Department provides limited and inconsistent rewards or acknowledgements for good behavior and job performance.
MPD personnel are often not reading or understanding new standard operating procedures or Code of Conduct standards when they are disseminated via email.
MPD does not encourage an open and consistent two-way communication between command staff or supervisors and employees.
Many MPD officers have the perception that there is a lack of transparency in the Department when determining who is chosen to attend specialized training, leading to a concern that there is favoritism among personnel.
MPD personnel are unclear on why the Department is driven by numbers. MPD personnel are unaware of what takes place at CompStat.