Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide an independent review of all vehicle pursuits conducted by the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) during the year 2018. The goal is to provide the public with an objective measure of the frequency and circumstance of vehicle pursuits engaged in by MPD officers. Vehicle pursuits have been characterized by the US Justice Department as “… possibly the most dangerous of all ordinary police activities”.\(^1\) Given the inherent risk of high-speed reckless driving to both the public and the officers, these police actions are generally under heightened scrutiny. Against that backdrop, this report is intended as a factual, informational, and unbiased tool for the public and policy makers to reference when examining this important topic.

Vehicle pursuits are formally defined in MPD Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 660 as:

1. **Eluding / fleeing**: An active attempt by one or more law enforcement officers to apprehend a suspect who is either an occupant of or operating a motor vehicle, during which time the operator of the motor vehicle is attempting to avoid capture by using high speed driving or other evasive tactics such as driving off a highway, or making sudden or unexpected maneuvers.

2. **Refusal to stop**: An active attempt by one or more law enforcement officers to stop a motor vehicle by use of emergency lights and siren, during which time the operator of the motor vehicle is driving at a reasonable speed (e.g., at or below the established speed limit), but willfully refusing to pull over and stop.

It should be noted that it is not considered a pursuit if the officer does not actively attempt to apprehend the suspect. For instance, if a squad activates its lights and/or siren attempting to pull over a vehicle and the vehicle flees, it will not be considered a pursuit until/unless the initiating officer decides to attempt apprehension of the occupants in the fleeing vehicle. Absent the initiation of a pursuit, instances such as this are classified as non-pursuits.

Decisions to attempt apprehension are also guided by MPD SOP 660, where section 660.20(C) currently states:

Vehicle pursuits are justified when the police member knows or has probable cause to believe:

1. The occupant(s) has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violent felony (e.g., armed robbery, recklessly endangering safety, and other crimes against a person in which violence is an element to the felony offense); or

2. The specific vehicle was used in or taken during the attempt or commission of a violent felony (e.g., armed robbery, recklessly endangering safety, and other crimes against a person in which violence is an element to the felony offense); or

3. The vehicle or occupant(s) present a clear and immediate threat to the safety of others and therefore the necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by the vehicle pursuit (e.g., misdemeanor shots fired incident in which a specific vehicle is described as being involved); or

4. The occupant(s) of the vehicle are engaged in drug dealing proximate in time to the initiation of the vehicle pursuit.

---

\(^1\) U.S. Department of Justice *Restrictive Policies for High-Speed Police Pursuits* (1990)
5. The necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by the vehicle pursuit, as in the case of the vehicle engaging in reckless driving.

6. A “refusal to stop” pursuit, as previously defined within this policy, may be initiated and maintained for a lesser offense than described above.

Even if a pursuit is justified, officers and their field supervisors are expected to use their discretion regarding the choice to initiate or continue a pursuit depending on a number of factors. Section 660.10(F)4 details the considerations that the involved officer and their field supervisor shall take when deciding to initiate or continue a pursuit:

- The seriousness of the offense;
- Necessity of pursuit by vehicle;
- Known information on the suspect;
- Road conditions and configuration (e.g. interstate, divided highway, work zone);
- Physical location and population density (e.g. residential area, school zone, business district);
- Existence of vehicular and pedestrian traffic;
- Lighting and visibility;
- Weather and environmental conditions;
- The relative performance capabilities of the pursuit vehicle and the vehicle being pursued;
- Officer training and experience;
- Available equipment;
- Speed and evasive tactics employed by the suspect;
- The presence of other persons in the police and suspect vehicle; and
- Any other condition or situation that would create an unreasonable risk.

Policy Evolution

Vehicle pursuits initiated before March of 2010 were under the guidance of a previous version of SOP 660 which stated that vehicle pursuits were authorized only when the law enforcement officer knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that:

1. The suspect presents a clear and immediate threat to the safety of others;
2. The suspect has committed or is attempting to commit a serious offense; or
3. The necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by the vehicle pursuit, as in the case of a serious traffic violation such as OWI, reckless driving, etc.

In response to a number of pursuit-related fatalities, a revision to the policy was adopted in March of 2010 that said that an officer must have probable cause that a violent felony has occurred or is about to occur instead of reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed or is attempting to commit a serious offense.² A key objective of this revision to the pursuit policy was to regulate officers’ decisions to initiate or continue a dangerous high-speed pursuit with someone who is not an immediate threat to the public.

---

² Probable cause is the quantum of evidence which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant committed a crime. It is more than a hunch or suspicion, but less than the evidence required to convict at trial.
An additional update to the SOP occurred in June of 2015 in response to increases in the number of vehicles taken in armed robberies (also known as “carjackings”). This policy change expanded permitted pursuits beyond persons involved in certain crimes to also include the vehicles involved in those crimes. Under the previous policy the officer engaging in the pursuit would have had to know that a person in the subject vehicle was involved in a violent felony in order to engage in a vehicle pursuit. Under the 2015 policy revision the department member would only have to know that the vehicle itself was involved in a violent felony (for instance, if it was taken during a carjacking) in order to engage in a vehicle pursuit.

The exact wording added at that time to SOP 660.20 is highlighted here:

B. Vehicle pursuits are justified only when the police member knows or has probable cause to believe:

2. The specific vehicle was used in or taken during the attempt or commission of a violent felony (e.g., armed robbery, recklessly endangering safety, and other crimes against a person in which violence is an element to the felony offense); or

3. The vehicle or occupant(s) present a clear and immediate threat to the safety of others and therefore the necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by the vehicle pursuit (e.g., misdemeanor shots fired incident in which a specific vehicle is described as being involved).

In September of 2017 another significant revision to the policy was enacted, wherein the categories of permitted vehicle pursuits were again expanded. These revisions were undertaken in an effort to address growing community concerns surrounding reckless driving and vehicle-based drug dealing. In compliance with a directive issued on July 13, 2017 from the board of Fire and Police Commissioners to MPD Chief Edward Flynn, the revised SOP allowed for department members to engage in a vehicle pursuit if the vehicle is engaged in reckless driving, as defined by Wis. Stat. § 346.62(2) and 939.25 or if the occupants of the vehicle are engaged in drug dealing.

The exact wording added at that time to SOP 660.20 is highlighted here:

C. Vehicle pursuits are justified when the police member knows or has probable cause to believe:

1. The occupant(s) has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violent felony (e.g., armed robbery, recklessly endangering safety, and other crimes against a person in which violence is an element to the felony offense); or

2. The specific vehicle was used in or taken during the attempt or commission of a violent felony (e.g., armed robbery, recklessly endangering safety, and other crimes against a person in which violence is an element to the felony offense); or

3. The vehicle or occupant(s) present a clear and immediate threat to the safety of others and therefore the necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by the vehicle pursuit (e.g., misdemeanor shots fired incident in which a specific vehicle is described as being involved); or

4. The occupant(s) of the vehicle are engaged in drug dealing proximate in time to the initiation of the vehicle pursuit.
5. The necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the level of danger created by the vehicle pursuit, as in the case of the vehicle engaging in reckless driving.

6. A “refusal to stop” pursuit, as previously defined within this policy, may be initiated and maintained for a lesser offense than described above.

When comparing year-to-year historical data in this report the above mentioned revisions should be kept in mind.

**Incident Reporting**

The vehicle pursuit data for this study was obtained from the Administrative Investigations Management (AIM) software system which MPD uses to manage internal incident investigations and reports. The non-pursuit data examined in this report was obtained from the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) database. As an oversight agency for the MPD, the FPC has independent and unencumbered access to these databases. Data used in this report is current as of January, 2019, but because many of the official reports were still classified as “open” at that time the exact totals are subject to change.

Per MPD SOP 660, a vehicle pursuit report must be completed in the AIM system by a supervisory officer of a higher rank than the member(s) engaged in the pursuit within three days of the incident. After review and correction by the shift commander/commanding officer these reports undergo subsequent review by the Internal Affairs Division (IAD).

If a non-pursuit occurs SOP 660 directs the department member on scene to provide an Emergency Communications Operator II in the Technical Communications Division (TCD) information about the incident for documentation in the CAD database. Proposed changes to SOP 660 are currently under consideration which instruct members to also document non-pursuit data and any subsequent investigatory information into the department’s Records Management System (RMS).

Over the years, software improvements have been made to the AIM system, and those improvements impacted the data which was available for this report. The earliest vehicle pursuit data available in the system dates back to 2002 but the array of data collected has changed over time; therefore not all data available now is available for all years. Thus, the choices of time span in the various data presentations has been guided by either availability of data or clarity of presentation.

**Pursuit Data**

**Number of Pursuits**

The MPD engaged in 940 vehicle pursuits in 2018, a 155% increase from the previous year and the most pursuits engaged in by the MPD since at least 2002 (Figure 1). The number of pursuits underwent a rapid decrease beginning in 2010 and reached a low of 50 pursuits in 2012. Between 2012 and 2014 there was a doubling in the number of pursuits (from 50 to 99) and an additional sharp increase of 166% in the number of vehicle pursuits between 2014 and 2015 (from 99 to 263).
All of these significant increases or decreases coincide with policy changes: the limiting of allowable pursuits in 2010, the broadening of allowable pursuits in 2015 to include vehicles involved in carjackings, and the further expansion of allowable pursuits in late 2017 to include vehicles engaged in reckless driving. This can be compared contextually to the years 2002 – 2009, during which there was a consistent pursuit policy which did not specifically restrict the types of allowable pursuits beyond very general guidance, instead relying more heavily on officer and supervisor discretion. During the years between 2002 and 2009 the number of pursuits year to year was less volatile and experienced a general long term decline.

Figure 1: Number of Vehicle Pursuits per Year

Time and Place
The time of day each pursuit was initiated in 2018 is detailed in Figure 2. During the 8 hours between 5:00 PM and 1:00 AM nearly 72% of the total number of pursuits were initiated.

The duration of each pursuit is detailed in Table 1. Fifty three pursuits (5.6%) lasted less than one minute and the large majority of pursuits (703; 74.8%) lasted 5 minutes or less. The average pursuit was 4 minutes and 48 seconds long in 2018. The longest pursuit duration during 2018 was 98 minutes; in that incident the pursuit was of a vehicle being driven recklessly. During that pursuit stop sticks were unsuccessfully deployed several times before a successful deployment disabled a tire of the fleeing vehicle. The vehicle continued to flee, driving on the disabled tire’s rim for over a half hour before the driver stopped the vehicle and fled on foot before being taken into custody. The driver of the vehicle in that incident was sentenced to four-and-a-half years in prison for charges related to the pursuit.
Figure 2: Time of Pursuit Initiation

Table 1: Pursuit Duration

A summary of the number of pursuits per month during 2018 is shown in Figure 3. During the first two months of 2018 there were relatively fewer pursuits initiated. During the remaining months the number of pursuits reached a per-month high of 105 in October. The average number of pursuits per month during 2018 was 78.
The number of vehicle pursuits per police district since 2016 is shown in Figure 4. The number of pursuits increased in every police district during 2018, with the greatest percent increases compared to 2017 occurring in districts 6 (425%) and 1 (350%) and the greatest numerical increases compared to 2017 occurring in districts 5 (178) and 7 (118). About half of all vehicle pursuits during 2018 occurred in police districts 5 and 7.

---

Figure 3: Pursuits per Month

Figure 4: Number of Pursuits per Police District

---

3 There are 25 incidents from 2018 not represented in this figure because the data did not indicate which police district it occurred in.
Speed of Pursuits

The maximum speed of each pursuit in 2018 is shown in Figure 5. About half (52.2%) of the pursuits in 2018 reached speeds in excess of 75 miles per hour (mph), and over 80% reached speeds at or above 60 mph. It is a relatively recent phenomenon for such a large percentage of pursuits to reach such high speeds (Figure 6). From 2007 to 2012 the proportion of pursuits which reached speeds greater than 75 mph was relatively constant between 10% and 20%. There was a modest increase in the years 2013 and 2014 followed by substantial additional increases in 2015 and 2016, with the proportion remaining around 50% in the years since.

Figure 5: Maximum Speed of Pursuits

Figure 6: Pursuits as Speeds Greater than 75 mph
Pursuit Initiation
Table 2 details the reported reason for the initiation of each vehicle pursuit engaged in during 2018. The most common reason for initiating a pursuit was in response to reckless driving (629 pursuits, 66.9%). If one considers this figure in the context of the 2017 policy change, the subtraction of the number of pursuits initiated in response to reckless driving from the total number of pursuits initiated during 2018 results in 311 pursuits initiated for reasons other than reckless driving. This number is very close to the total number of pursuits engaged in during the previous full year of data preceding the 2017 policy change (2016, 306 pursuits).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Pursuit Initiation</th>
<th>Number of Pursuits</th>
<th>Percent of Pursuits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug Related Offense</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Offense - Reckless Vehicle</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Felony</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Reason for Pursuit Initiation

Stolen Status
Table 3 details the number of vehicle pursuits that were of vehicles positively identified as stolen within each pursuit initiation category. This is an account of only those positively identified as stolen; it is possible that more vehicles involved in pursuits may have been stolen. In 2018 29.8% of all vehicle pursuits were of vehicles positively identified as stolen.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Pursuit Initiation</th>
<th>Number in pursuit of a stolen vehicle</th>
<th>Percent of Pursuits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug Related Offense</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Offense - Reckless Vehicle</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Felony</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Pursuits of Known Stolen Vehicles

Pursuit Accidents and Injuries
The number of pursuits resulting in vehicle accidents per year since 2007 are shown in Figure 7. The blue bars represent the actual number of pursuit accidents and correspond to the left axis. The red line represents the percent of pursuits each year which resulted in accident and corresponds to the right axis. The number of pursuits resulting in an accident was far higher during 2018 compared to prior years; this is the result of the far higher overall number of pursuits engaged in since the percent of pursuits resulting in accident is only slightly higher. The general trend between 2007 and 2015 had been a decline in the percent of pursuits which result in an accident, until a stabilization of the percentage occurred beginning in 2015. In 2007 47.2% of vehicle pursuits resulted in an accident and in 2018 the proportion was 25.5%.
In 2018 there were 13 pursuits resulting in department employee injury (1% of all pursuits), 38 resulting in 3rd party injury (4% of all pursuits), and 112 resulting in pursuit subject injury (12% of all pursuits). All of these totals are increases compared to 2017 and are higher than in previous years (Figure 8). The account of accidents and injury in this report is limited to those occurring during an active pursuit. Accidents and injuries occurring after pursuits have been terminated or after non-pursuits are not included.
For pursuits resulting in 3rd party injury the AIM database only contains a yes/no field indicating if such an injury occurred or not, while for subject and officer injuries there are additional fields which report the severity of the injury and the identity of the injured party. In order to examine in more detail the number of 3rd persons injured and the severity of those injuries the accident reports related to each of these pursuits were manually reviewed. Of the injuries reported in the related accident reports there were 18 injuries described as minor and 8 described as serious, with the remaining described as either pain, no apparent injury or possible injury.

In the 112 pursuits which resulted in subject injury 165 individual subject injuries were recorded. Five subject injuries were fatal, 7 injuries were classified as major, 14 injuries were classified as moderate, 2 injuries were related to an Electronic Control Device (ECD) deployment upon conclusion of the pursuit, and the remaining 137 injuries were classified as minor. Of the non-fatal injuries, 19 were described as bruises or contusions, 9 as broken bones or teeth, 31 as abrasions, cuts or lacerations, 1 as a bite, and the remaining 100 were complaints of pain.

In the 13 pursuits which resulted in department member injury there were 20 department members injured with 2 members each injured in 2 separate pursuits; resulting in 22 employee injuries. One member’s injuries were fatal, 2 members had injuries classified as major, and the remaining 19 injuries were classified as minor. Of the 22 employee injuries, 15 (68%) were reported to be using safety equipment and 7 (32%) were reported to not be using safety equipment. It should be noted only the driver and passenger of squads in the primary pursuing position are listed in this report. If a secondary or tertiary pursuing squad were involved in an accident the data regarding those potential member injuries is not accounted for here.

**Pursuit Outcomes**

The subject apprehension rate of vehicle pursuits is charted in Figure 9. In 2010 62 of the 68 pursuits (91.2%) which were engaged in resulted in subject apprehension. Over the past 4 years the subject apprehension rate has been relatively consistent between 30 and 40 percent.
The apprehension rate of vehicle pursuits can be better understood by examining the reported outcomes of the pursuits, detailed for 2018 in Table 3. Pursuits in which the suspect is not apprehended are often terminated by the MPD, and 353 pursuits (38%) were terminated by MPD in 2018 for a variety of reasons. Of the pursuits terminated by the MPD, the reported reason(s) for pursuit termination are detailed in Table 4. Note that more than one reason may be listed as a reason for pursuit termination. The most commonly reported reason for terminating a pursuit was the subject’s vehicle location or distance.

**Table 4: Outcomes of Pursuits**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome of Pursuit</th>
<th>Number of Pursuits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terminated - By Law Enforcement</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violator Escape</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminated - Crash</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminated - Violator Stopped</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violator Vehicle Failure</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Reasons for Pursuit Termination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Pursuit Termination</th>
<th>Number of Pursuits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Vehicle Location / Distance</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directed by Higher Rank</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic, Roadway, Environment Conditions</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not meet Criteria under 660.20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Equipment Malfunction</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect's Identity Established</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Render Aid to Injured Person(s)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10 shows the most common pursuit outcomes since 2007 as a percentage of pursuits for each year. In the years between 2007 and 2010 the various pursuit outcomes were relatively flat. Since 2010, the percentages of pursuits terminating in a crash or the subject stopping have both declined while the percentage of pursuits terminated by Law Enforcement or where the violator escapes have risen, though in 2018 there was a modest decline in the percentage terminated by law enforcement and a modest increase in the percentage in which the violator stops.

Figure 10: Pursuit Outcomes

The most common criminal charges requested upon subject apprehension are, as one would expect, charges directly related to the pursuit itself such as fleeing, resisting arrest, and recklessly endangering safety. Beyond those charges, 581 individuals were alleged to be operating the automobile without the owner’s consent, 101 individuals were alleged to be in possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, 96 individuals alleged to be in possession of controlled substances, 88 individuals were alleged to be felons in possession of firearms.
Of the 629 pursuits that were initiated in response to reckless driving there were 271 individuals whom were alleged to be operating the automobile without the owner’s consent, 79 individuals were alleged to be in possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, 66 individuals were alleged to be in possession of controlled substances, and 55 individuals were alleged to be felons in possession of firearms.

**Pursuit Subject Age**

The 940 vehicle pursuits that occurred in 2018 involved 697 identified subjects (including both drivers and passengers). Two hundred sixty one (37.4%) of the known pursuit subjects were age 18 or younger, the median age of known pursuit subjects was 20 and the average age was 21.7. Figure 11 details the median age of known pursuit subjects since 2002. After a long term decline in the median age, from a high of 40 in 2003 to a low of 18 in 2016, the median age has risen by one year in each of the past 2 years.

![Figure 11: Median Age of Pursuit Subjects](image)

**Non-Pursuits**

Non-pursuits are incidents in which a stop is attempted, the vehicle continues, and a pursuit is not initiated. Upon the request of members of the Milwaukee Common Council, the FPC released its first comprehensive review of non-pursuit incidents in concert with the release of the 2016 Vehicle Pursuit Report.

The non-pursuit report for 2016 analyzed a number of data elements, made possible because there was a period of time in 2014 and 2015 in which these events were recorded in detail in the AIM system. However, beginning in late 2015 non-pursuit events were no longer recorded in the AIM system and instead were recorded in the CAD database. Recording the events in the CAD database allows for faster and easier record keeping for department members but limits the detail of and analysis potential for the data.

---

4 Age data for the years 2005 and 2006 was unavailable.
data. Information regarding the subject vehicle license plate, vehicle description, stolen status, etc. (when known) is contained in a narrative field, which while easy to examine on a case by case basis is not easily analyzed in bulk.

On October 6, 2017 Assistant Chief Harpole issued a department-wide memorandum instructing all members to once again record details of non-pursuit events into the department’s record management system (RMS) as well as the CAD system. This practice is also currently in process of being incorporated into the MPD’s vehicle pursuit SOP. Unfortunately, however, at the time of this report’s authorship there are technical issues related to the department’s implementation of new RMS software which are preventing accurate global analysis of this data. Thus the data presented in this report regarding non-pursuits is limited to the number of incidents and has been obtained from the CAD database.

Figure 12 details the number of non-pursuit events each month between 2015 and 2018. There had been a slow rise in the number of non-pursuits during 2015 and 2016, with a more dramatic increase throughout 2017. The decrease in frequency beginning in September 2017 occurred coincident with the expansion of the pursuit policy in late September 2017. Decreases in non-pursuit occurrences continued through the summer of 2018 and remained relatively consistent since then. There were 2798 non-pursuits in 2018, 8502 in 2017, 4297 in 2016, and 2957 in 2015.
Propensity to Flee

The overall propensity for subjects to flee from traffic stops can be calculated by dividing the number of pursuit and non-pursuit instances by the total number of traffic stops. Figure 13 details the results of that calculation for each month since January of 2016.

The first 6 months of 2016 had a relatively consistent rate of vehicular flight between 2 and 3 percent of all traffic stops. From July 2016 through August 2017 there were increases in the percentage of traffic stops which resulted in flight, reaching a maximum of 8.7% in July 2017. Beginning in October 2017 a rapid decrease in this percentage was seen, reaching a low of 3.2% of all traffic stops in February 2018. The remainder of 2018 generally had vehicular flight percentages between 4% and 5% of all traffic stops.

Figure 13: Percent of Traffic Stops Resulting in Flight

5 There is some minor imperfection in these calculations because small numbers of pursuits and non-pursuits are sometimes included in the traffic stop totals. Given the scale of the number of traffic stops compared to the number of pursuits and non-pursuits, however, discrepancies of this magnitude do not materially impact the results of the analysis.
Summary

In 2018 the MPD engaged in 940 vehicle pursuits; this is the highest total number of vehicle pursuits since at least 2002. This was a 155% increase compared to 2017 with most of the increase due to the pursuit of vehicles engaged in reckless driving (629 pursuits, 67% of total). At the same time there was a decrease in both the number of non-pursuit incidents and the overall percentage of vehicles fleeing from traffic stops when compared to 2017.

The percentage of pursuits resulting in an accident has increased slightly but due to the large increase in the overall number of pursuits the number resulting in accident is much higher (240 in 2018, 85 in 2017). The number of pursuits resulting in injury also increased more than 3-fold for subjects, 3rd parties, and department members.

The number of pursuits reaching high speeds continues to be high; like 2016 and 2017, about half of all pursuits in 2018 reached speeds greater than 75 miles per hour. The age of pursuit subjects continues to be low when compared to previous years, but the median age has increased in each of the past two years and is now 20 years of age. The apprehension rate of vehicle pursuits continues to be lower than in most past years and for the past 4 years it has been between 30% and 40%. Though in 2018 there was a modest decline in the percentage of pursuits terminated by law enforcement and a modest increase in the percentage in which the violator stops, the various pursuit outcomes remain starkly different when compared to the years 2007-2010.